Letter to Friedrich Engels, March 25, 1856

MARX TO ENGELS

IN MANCHESTER

[London,] Tuesday [25 March 1856]^[1]

Dear Engels,

In one of my next letters I shall reply to your last. Today simply an inquiry, to which I should like, if possible, an answer by return. I did not send any article to the Tribune today because I hadn't finished reading the BLUE BOOK:^[2] on Kars—I only got hold of it late yesterday evening. I have to send off my article^[3] on Friday, at the same time as the one I am expecting from you. Well, ad rem^[4]

A large part of the BLUE BOOK is of a purely military nature; you will be able to see later whether anything can be done with it. But there's one point on which I want your critical OPINION, since it is also material to the political-diplomatic aspect of the matter and I have got to discuss it in this Friday's article. At the end of June the Turks proposed to send reinforcements to Redoute-Kaleh^[5] in order to operate from there in the direction of Kutais,^[6] etc. The British government, on the other hand, wanted to send a relief force to Erzerum via Trebizond and, it seems, to abandon Kars as a place of little importance, regarding Erzerum as the centre of resistance. At all events this dispute meant that the moment propitious for action was irretrievably lost. So that you may be FULLY informed on the QUESTION I append here the crucial EXTRACTS.

Stratford de Redcliffe to Clarendon. 28th June, 1855.

• 'The Turkish ministers, who had talked of sending 10,000 men from Batoum^[7] to Erzeroum, now, in their embarrassment, incline to another plan. They propose to form an entrenched camp at Redoute-Kaleh, and to concentrate there the corps of General Vivian—completed by a draft of 10,000 men from the Bulgarian army—that of General Beatson, and the detachment from Batoum, reduced to 7,000 men. The total of these combined forces would be about 30,000 of all arms. Stationary they might operate as a diversion in favour of the army at Kars or Erzeroum; advancing by Kutais or Georgia they might either attack the Russians in the rear or force them to retreat.'*

Id to id., 30th June, 1855.

• 'The meeting which I had previously announced, took place this morning at the Grand Vizier's^[8] house on the Bosphorus. In addition to his Highness, the Seraskier^[9] and Fuad Effendi were present. I was accompanied by Brigadier-General Mansfield.... It appears, that the Russians advancing from Gumri^[10] with an amount of force varying from 20-30,000, had presented themselves before Kars; that a partial engagement of Cavalry had taken place, followed two days later by an attack, which had been repulsed, on the part of the enemy, and that the town was threatened with a siege.... It was clear, to all present, that whether the Russians besieged or turned Kars, the Turkish army required an effort to be made for its relief with all practicable despatch, and that of 3 possible modes of acting for that purpose, the only one likely to prove effective was an expedition by Kutais into Georgia. To send reinforcements by Trebizond would be at best a palliative. To establish an entrenched camp at Redoute-Kaleh, would, at this unhealthy season, be equivalent to consigning the troops to destruction. The real question was, whether a force numerically sufficient, and in all respects effective, could be collected in time at Kutais to make an excursion into Georgia and threaten the communications of the Russian army.... The Turkish ministers proposed that the expeditionary force should be composed of 12,000 men from Batoum and the neighbouring stations; of the troops made over to General Vivian, and estimated at 10,000 of all arms; of General Beatson's Irregular Cavalry, of 10,000 men to be detracted from the army in Bulgaria as the complement of the Turkish contingent; of 5,000 more derived from the same source; of an Egyptian regiment of horse now here, and of another regiment expected from Tunis. To these the Seraskier proposed to add 2,000 Albanians by way of riflemen. These several forces... would present a total of 44,000 men, not perhaps to be reckoned with prudence at more than 36,000 effectives.' *

Id. to id., 1st July, 1855

• '...the proposed diversion at Redoute-Kaleh originated with the Porte.'*

Clarendon to Stratford de Redcliffe. July 13th, 1855.

• '...Her Majesty's^[11] government are of opinion, that the wiser course would be to send reinforcements to the rear of the Turkish army, instead of sending an expedition to the rear of the Russian army. The reinforcements might go to Trebizond, and be directed from thence upon Erzeroum. The distance from Trebizond to Erzeroum is less than that from Redoute-Kaleh to Tiflis,^[12] and the march is through a friendly instead of through a hostile country; and at Erzeroum the army would meet supporting friends instead of opposing enemies, and supplies instead of famine. If the army at Kars cannot maintain that position against the Russians, [...] it will be easier to defeat them by the whole force collected, than by divided portions of that force; and a defeat would be the more decisive, the further it took place within the Turkish frontier. Trebizond is a place where supplies of all kinds might be landed etc' *

Id. to id., 14th July, 1855 (telegraphic).

• 'The plan for reinforcing the army at Kars contained in your despatch of the 30th June and 1st inst., is disapproved. [...] Trebizond ought to be the base of operations, and if the Turkish army of Kars and Erzeroum cannot hold out at the latter place against the Russians, it might fall back on Trebizond, where it would easily be reinforced.'*

Id. to id., 16th July, 1855.

• 'If, indeed, Omer Pasha... should determine to take any part of his own army, with Tunisians and Albanians to Redoute-Kaleh, Her Majesty's government would have nothing to say to that proceeding, but as regards the contingent under General Vivian and General Beatson's Horse, Her Majesty's government abide by their opinion that they should be directed through Trebizond or Erzeroum.'*

Lord Panmure to General Vivian, 14th July, 1855.

• '...I place such full reliance on your professional ability, that I feel no anxiety lest you should undertake any expedition of a nature so wild and ill-digested as that contemplated by the Porte.... A coup de main by means of suddenly throwing an army on the coast to threaten, or even to attack an enemy's stronghold, is one thing, but a deliberate expedition to invade an enemy's country, and on his own territory to make war upon him, is quite another.'*

I must confess that Clarendon's strategy strikes me as curious in the extreme, as does also the fine distinction drawn by Lord Panmure Carnot favouring the Sevastopol coup de main against the Turkish plan for a strategic move in Georgia.

If possible, then, an answer to these points by return. Salut.

Your

K. M.